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In this study the temporal aspect of consciousness is analyzed. We start from the notion that
while conscious experience seems to change constantly, yet for any contents of experience to
be consciously perceived they must last for some non-zero duration of time, which appears
to constitute a certain conflict. We posit that, in terms of phenomenological analysis of
consciousness, the temporal aspect, and this apparent conflict in particular, is the most
basic property, likely inherent to any conceivable form of consciousness. We then put forward
arguments for the synaptic clock to be a content-specific neural substrate of consciousness,
showing how it would correspond to this temporal aspect. This proposal is considered in
light of the information integration theory of consciousness, and other theories that relate
consciousness to processes of learning and memory. It is outlined how this can offer a
concrete way of relating the properties of consciousness directly to the neural plasticity
mechanisms of learning and memory. In this regard, we propose a viewpoint, in which an
association between different contents of conscious experience can be created in a form of
relational memory only if they occur at the very same moment of subjective time, with
moments of subjective time having different durations depending on the type of information
processed, proportional to the time units of corresponding synaptic clocks, and being in
principle different for different brain regions and nervous systems in different animal species.
Finally, using this viewpoint, we consider the two alternative views on the structure of
consciousness, namely a static and a dynamic one, and argue in favor of the latter, proposing
that consciousness can be best understood if change is considered its only dimension.
Keywords: activity-dependent synaptic plasticity, evolutionary ecology, information inte-
gration theory of consciousness, learning and memory, physical substrates of consciousness,
time, time perception
1 Introduction
It has been long observed that an association between two
percepts, thoughts, or contents of conscious experience in
general, can be created in a form of relational memory if
they occur in temporal proximity. It is unclear, however,
what exactly does it mean for two such events in one’s
mental life to occur in temporal proximity–how long such
a temporal distance between two events of the same or
different modalities can be, or, first of all, how can the
time of the flow of conscious experience be measured?
Is it adequate for it to be expressed and measured in
the units of physical time, i.e., the ones in which time is
measured by conventional, physical clocks?
In order to address these questions in a strict manner,
it is necessary to determine what exactly is the relation
between subjective experience, i.e., consciousness, and,
on the other hand, objective reality, part of which the
physical clocks are–in other words, assuming that one’s
subjective experience is always related to some physical
processes, to have a definition of what exactly consti-
tutes a physical substrate of consciousness, what within
that substrate constitutes a given experience with some
specific contents, and what kind of rule, if any, governs
the progression and succession of various contents. The
common notion that subjective time indeed can be ex-
pressed in the units of what is considered physical time,
seems to be based on an assumption that this relation
is of a one-to-one nature, namely that any one ’tick’ of
some underlying physical system will always correspond
to one ’tick’ of subjective experience. However, as so far
there seems to be no evidence for this to be the case (and
it is hard to imagine how this sort of dependency could
ever be verified experimentally), a reasonable approach
to take is to assume that this relation is not necessarily
of such a straightforward nature.
Here we take this approach and argue that, in case of
biological systems, combining certain observations com-
ing from the two domains, specifically the fact of linking
of subjectively experienced events that occurred in tem-
poral proximity, with the knowledge about putative neu-
ral mechanisms of learning and memory and, in particu-
lar, of linking memories over time, might be informative
in terms of elucidating what are the exact content-specific
neural substrates of consciousness.
To this end, we analyze the temporal aspect of con-
sciousness, and consider an idea that a content-specific
neural substrate of consciousness can be found directly
in the mechanisms of neural plasticity underlying pro-
cesses of learning and memory. In particular, we put for-
ward arguments showing why synaptic clock, a hypothet-
ical mechanism we recently proposed based on activity-
dependent synaptic plasticity, specifically a generalized
notion of synaptic tagging [1], could constitute such a
substrate. This proposal is analyzed in light of certain
aspects of theories relating consciousness to processes of
learning and memory and plasticity of the nervous sys-
tem [2–5], as well as in light of the information integra-
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tion theory of consciousness (IIT) [6, 7]. IIT starts from
a set of axioms derived from a phenomenological analysis
of consciousness, and posits that consciousness is related
to the capacity of a system for information integration.
We start from the notion that consciousness on its most
basic level seems to be, first of all, temporal in nature,
that is notion laying somewhat beyond the scope of at-
tention of IIT and many other theories, and show that,
nonetheless, there is a specific sense in which it can be
stated that through the mechanism proposed information
is integrated.
From a perspective outlined we then consider con-
sciousness in more general terms, showing how analysis
of the actual meaning of this ’temporality’ of conscious-
ness can be informative for attempts of defining the exact
relation between one’s subjective experience and the ob-
jective reality, or consciousness’ ’place’ within the physi-
cal world. In particular, this approach allows to propose
a specific interpretation of a view according to which the
brain actually learns to be conscious [2].
2 Synaptic clock as a neural sub-
strate of consciousness
Time as an universal ecological dimension
From the perspective of an individual organism, the se-
quences of objects in specific spatial configurations, and
specific events, that it encounters over its lifetime, as
well as specific behaviors that it performs in those situ-
ations, execution of which is constrained and enabled by
the architecture and learned functionalities of its nervous
system, are unique for individuals from different animal
species as well as for every individual belonging to a given
species (Figure 1A, top part). However, all those events
always take place in time, they take time, and the dis-
tance between consecutive events, actions, and environ-
mental feedbacks that are used to evaluate those actions,
as well as memory of the events, can always be considered
as temporal in nature. They can be marked, in a sense, on
lines, that would be identical for every organism (Figure
1A, bottom part). From this point of view, point of view
of the individual, time is more fundamental than space,
in the sense that in order to traverse any spatial distance
it always takes some amount of time, whereas time passes
even without one changing its spatial position. In other
words, to learn a space, it always takes time–for an in-
dividual a space is a more abstract concept, that can be
reconstructed from memory accumulated over time.
From this perspective, interactions of an organism with
its surroundings can be depicted as a loop (Figure 1B),
in which sensory cues that the organism receives at any
given moment of time depend on, that is, in other words,
are feedbacks for, the motor actions it performed in previ-
ous moments of time. It should be noted that by "motor
actions" we mean here also a lack of any actions, that is,
for instance, a decision made by the animal, caused by
it having spotted a predator, to stand still and not make
any movements. And by "feedbacks", analogously, we
mean here also a lack of any changes in the outside world,
that is, for instance, the predator not moving towards the
animal after it did not make any rapid movements that
would attract the predator’s attention. Defined in this
way, both the motor actions are always associated with
some underlying neural activity, be it even such result-
ing in the suppression of execution of some specific move-
ment, or continuation of a previous one, as well as some
sensory cues or feedbacks will be at all times processed
and evaluated, and will be related to some neural activ-
ity, in order to assess what outcomes the motor actions
had brought for the organism (in some systems resulting
in, at least, fluctuations of what could be considered a
baseline-level emotional state).
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Figure 1: Time as an universal ecological dimension. (A)
Time as an universal dimension in interactions of organ-
isms with their environments. (B) Organism–outside
world feedback loop of interactions. (C) Comparison of
clocks with discrete and persistent ticks. Judgments of
the duration of a time interval, according to different
clocks, all ticking at the same rate–a classic one with
discrete ticks (top), and two with ticks of different non-
zero durations (middle and bottom), as in the synaptic
clock model. Although the total number of ticks gener-
ated over the interval as a whole is equal according to
each of the clocks (as would be assessed retrospectively),
what differentiates these clocks is the timing of the short
sub-interval (between gray dashed lines), with different
numbers of changes detected, which is due to different
durations of the persistence of their respective ticks.
In this sense time seems therefore to be the most basic,
universal ecological dimension of learning and memory,
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offering thus an evolutionary-ecological perspective that
is common for all organisms, and suggesting that some
universal rules might have developed utilizing this fact,
as all other aspects of brain functioning are, in a sense,
subordinated to this dimension.
The perspective outlined is in particular the perspec-
tive of an individual’s subjective experience. Along a line
like the ones on Figure 1A proceed one’s mental states,
i.e., conscious experience, being located, in a sense, in
between the generation of motor actions and detection
of sensory cues/feedbacks, as is also the case for neural
activity to which it is related. What an individual ex-
periences at any given moment, is the flow of contents
of experience, or, in other words, the flow of subjective
time.
Perception of time flow as the most basic
aspect of consciousness
It seems that reasoning like the above can be extended
even further, and it can be posited that the most basic
aspect common to the conscious experience of any sys-
tem, if only it is endowed with consciousness, is the very
fact of the perception of time flow, as everything else
might be, conceivably, perceived differently. Namely, for
instance, perception of colors: what I perceive as color
red can be completely different from what you perceive
as color red. We use the same word to describe it–"red"–
and we agree that what we both are seeing is "red", but
what each of us actually sees, and thus means by "red",
can be completely different (e.g., your "red" could be my
"green", and vice versa) and there is no way to communi-
cate it. The same applies to all other elements of mental
life in general. Moreover, in terms of different percepts
in a given individual, what we can only say about them
is, for instance, that what I perceive as color red is differ-
ent than what I perceive as color blue, or that color red
is different than a percept of a sound, but I am unable
to say how exactly they are different, or what exactly
makes them so. Perhaps, if we assume that the ability
to have those percepts is a product of evolution, the cor-
responding qualities, as far as such correspondence can
be defined, will be similar in individuals within the same
species (although, in fact, there seems to be no utilitarian
reason whatsoever for this to be the case), but they might
likely be very different in individuals from distant species,
e.g., in humans and in flies, respectively. This reasoning
leads eventually to the conclusion that the only aspect
of conscious experience that will be common to any con-
ceivable form of consciousness, in different systems, is the
very feeling of the fact of time flow, i.e., constant flow of
conscious experience.
Assuming that consciousness is subject to evolution
and is graded (i.e., evolving from simpler forms, as op-
posed to appearing suddenly in some species in an ’elabo-
rated’ form), then even in the case of a simplest conscious
system conceivable, capable of having only an experience
of "this rather than not this" [8] (e.g., "light rather than
not light"), it will experience the flow of time–that is, at
least, an experience of "this rather than not this" actu-
ally appearing and/or disappearing.
However, despite this constant flow that cannot be vol-
untarily stopped, a percept, thought, or any contents of
experience in general, needs to last for some non-zero du-
ration of time in a seemingly unchanged form in order to
be consciously perceived, i.e., ’registered’ in conscious-
ness, which appears to constitute a certain conflict. How
to reconcile these two notions? How long exactly such
contents persist in consciousness?
It seems that such persistence requires a form of imme-
diate memory, analogously to the transient persistence
of visual stimuli, that would persist in, or actually, as
consciousness, for a certain amount of time before it is
’replaced’ by another content (and that can potentially
proceed to be stored as a longer-lasting memory). Based
on studies in the visual system, it is estimated that in
humans such percepts last usually not less than tens
of milliseconds and not more than hundreds of millisec-
onds [8, 9]. In other species this is assessed by indirect
measures, and represented by the values of Critical Fre-
quency of Flicker Fusion (CFF), determining the dura-
tions of persistence of visual stimuli that leads to fusion
of consecutive stimuli, which lay in the range from less
than ten milliseconds (in insects), to below one hundred
milliseconds (in turtles) [10]. However, what about other
types of mental states, beyond primary sensory percep-
tion, e.g., more abstract thoughts? How long they can,
or should, last in different conscious systems that can
possibly be thought of? As the values of CFF display a
specific species-varied pattern that can be attributed to
evolutionary-ecological processes [10], suggesting that the
persistence of visual percepts is precisely tuned in par-
ticular species, it seems reasonable to assume that the
persistence of other types of contents of conscious expe-
rience will also be shaped evolutionarily, in accord with
the visual system’s CFF, so that they last as long as it
is suitable for individuals from species living in given cir-
cumstances, not too long and not too short, likely being
proportional to intervals separating behaviorally relevant
events in which a corresponding type of information is
processed.
That this is indeed the case is suggested by the variable
speed of our subjective perception of time flow, where
intervals of absolute time of a constant length appear to
us as having variable durations–which implies that the
contents of experience can persist for different amounts
of time, making us unable to distinguish shorter frag-
ments within such interval of time in which the contents
of experience were fixed, a phenomenon which seems to
be related with the type of information processed. For
example, it seems that processing of more abstract in-
formation, like a spatial information about environment,
related with the feeling of knowing "where I am at the
moment", or when solving a mathematical problem, is
related to contents of experience that persist for longer
time periods, increasing the perceived speed of time flow,
when it is assessed in retrospection.
The concept of synaptic clock, which in the cognitive
domain is based on generalization of a rule based on
the visual CFF to other aspects of brain function, de-
scribes how the persistence of different types of informa-
tion could span broader time ranges, resulting in different
’CFF’s, being subject to specific selective pressures [1]
(Figure 1C). This thus situates the synaptic clock as a
potential content-specific neural substrate of conscious-
ness, that will in some way correlate with the persistence
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of various contents in conscious experience, a hypothesis
which we shall consider next.
Synaptic plasticity as content-specific sub-
strate of consciousness
Usually, when potential neural correlates of consciousness
are being considered, including their content-specific sub-
sets, what is thought of most naturally as a candidate
mechanism is, essentially, neurons firing action poten-
tials. Such correlates are sought primarily in patterns
of neuronal firing, global or localized to specific systems,
reflected directly by spikes or by oscillatory activities of
field potentials, interpreted as effects of synchronized fir-
ing of groups of cells [2,7]. As neuronal firing is necessary
for the nervous system and organism as a whole to func-
tion properly, it is perhaps also necessary for conscious
experience as such, and thus its contents, to be possi-
ble to occur in such organisms–it will always be there,
in one way or another correlating with experience. How-
ever, there seems to be no evidence showing why neu-
ronal firing as such should be in a privileged position in
this regard, and should constitute a substrate directly
related to some specific contents of a conscious experi-
ence. It can be noted that, in principle, every event of
neuronal firing is always associated with some synaptic
stimulation, either the one exerted through some of the
presynaptic inputs to a given cell, resulting in its firing,
or stimulation of some of its postsynaptic targets, or, in
most cases, both (as a rule, rather– e.g., in the case of
electric synaptic junctions signals propagate until they
reach some chemical synapses that will be ’stimulated’ in
more evident, literal way, etc). While this notion can be
taken as an argument showing that these two aspects of
neural activity, i.e., neuronal firing and synaptic activ-
ity, respectively, cannot in practice, in an intact system,
be effectively disentangled, there nevertheless are some
features of synaptic activity, and of synaptic plasticity
elicited by synaptic stimulation, as represented in the
synaptic clock hypothesis in particular, that we will now
discuss, and that allow to see it as more well-suited (and
having more to ’offer’, in terms of a broader repertoire
of possible mechanisms in play) as a direct candidate for
a content-specific neural substrate of consciousness, than
neuronal firing per se.
Even if consciousness arises due to complexity, i.e., in
certain sufficiently complex systems, as is suggested by
IIT, it appears to us that as far as biological systems are
concerned, it is desirable to seek for some biological mo-
tivations for it to arise, that is, specific mechanisms or
aspects of a system’s activity that could possibly be as-
sociated with it in a conceptual manner. Here we aim at
making such an attempt, trying in particular to account
for the above-discussed temporal aspect of consciousness.
Synaptic clock hypothesis assumes a brain-wide dis-
tribution of default durations of persistence of transient,
activity-dependent synaptic traces. By synaptic trace it
defines an event of transient synaptic plasticity, based on
a generalized notion of synaptic tagging, constituting a
memory trace of previous synaptic input, or, more gen-
erally, of previous synaptic activity. As an instance, we
will consider here a general case of an event of synap-
tic tagging (as is studied mostly in rodent hippocampal
cells), triggered by weak synaptic stimulation, mediated
by activation of NMDA receptors, associated with pro-
tein synthesis-independent early phase of Long-Term Po-
tentiation (LTP), or Long-Term Depression (LTD), and
which can be transformed into a late phase of LTP (l-
LTP) or LTD, with the late phase being dependent on
(1) plasticity-related proteins (PRPs), needed to actually
implement a longer-lasting synaptic change, and (2) some
external (i.e., extracellular), more global reinforcing sig-
nals (e.g., dopamine; which stimulate/modulate the pro-
duction of PRPs and/or directly modulate the synaptic
change), that both can be delivered to the synapse with
a delay after an initial synaptic event [11].
The arguments (some of which could be called ’intu-
itive’) are as follows:
1. Consciousness is informative, i.e., constituted al-
ways by some specific content. And it can be stated, in
general terms, that whereas the role of neuronal firing
and synaptic transmission is to transmit signals, the role
of synaptic plasticity is to encode and store information
within a network. It is then reasonable to assume that
information that is actually being encoded by particular
synapses will correspond to the contents of an ongoing
conscious experience;
2. Every one content of conscious experience persists
in time, for some non-zero duration of time. It can be
stated, in general terms again, that whereas an action
potential is a discrete event, meaning that it does not
persist anywhere but propagates from one place to an-
other, synaptic memory trace, in contrast, does persist
for a prolonged period of time in a well-localized site–it
is a persistence of a previous activity state;
3. Conscious experience flows at all times, i.e., changes
constantly. And while synaptic trace is something
that persists, it also is, by definition, synaptic change–
together with point 2 it thus directly (i.e., literally) cor-
responds to our main issue as discussed above;
4. According to IIT, consciousness is related to in-
formation integration. And synaptic trace, in itself, in-
tegrates information. Specifically, on the one hand, tak-
ing the example of spike-timing-dependent Hebbian plas-
ticity, as embodied in the process of LTP mediated by
NMDA receptor activation, it is triggered by, and necessi-
tates, the integration of a specific pattern of presynaptic
activity with postsynaptic depolarization, all with spe-
cific timing, which altogether might determine whether
the synapse will undergo LTP or LTD, which in turn de-
termines its effect on subsequent network activity, routes
of signal transduction, and eventually behavior. Besides
that, the late phase of plasticity (l-LTP) is dependent on
specific PRPs and neuromodulatory signals, delivery and
action of which depends on the behavior of animal and
patterns of neural activity in a prolonged time window
after, as well as before, the initial synaptic stimulation–
the final fate of synaptic change, and future activity of
the circuit it is a part of, is thus determined by, i.e., in-
tegrates, a combination of numerous events and specific
patterns of activity (and in this regard it seems to be
more ’fragile’ than cell’s firing–namely, with thousands of
synaptic connections that an average cell receives, cell’s
firing, comparing to the plasticity of a particular synapse,
is degenerated, in the sense that the same effect, i.e., an
increase or decrease in a firing rate, can be achieved by
4
many different patterns of cell stimulation);
5. Relating to the above point, a substrate of con-
sciousness is sought, among other mechanisms, in re-
current interactions, that might be involved in certain
top-down signaling processes in the brain. As this type
of activity is especially likely to activate NMDA recep-
tors, whose activation at the moment of a recurrent signal
would be enabled due to the cell’s membrane depolariza-
tion caused by a preceding stimulation by feedforward
signal, and NMDA receptors are implicated in synap-
tic plasticity, like LTP, it is thus hypothesized that con-
sciousness might be not due to recurrent interactions per
se, but rather due to a sequence of events that they trig-
ger, starting with the initiation of synaptic plasticity [4].
This would implicate the proposed mechanism of synap-
tic clock into effects associated with recurrent interac-
tions in the brain;
6. IIT posits that even inactive, i.e., non-firing, cells
can contribute and shape the contents of a conscious ex-
perience (but not cells that are artificially, e.g., pharma-
cologically, blocked–i.e., functionally detached from the
rest of a network) [8]. In line with this notion, synaptic
traces are assumed to persist as well in neurons which
are silent, in terms of not generating action potentials at
the moment. This could limit a possible pool of inactive
cells that should be taken under consideration, defining
when a given cell can contribute directly to a conscious
experience–that is, only when synaptic clock that has
been activated in that cell is still active. It seems more
likely that only such a cells will contribute directly to an
experience, as opposed to ones in which there is nothing
that could be considered a trace, or ’evidence’, of any ac-
tivity that would make it involved in network activities
and make it directly affect a conscious experience;
7. Neural substrate of consciousness may not be fixed,
restricted to some specific circuits or populations of cells,
or specific patterns of neuronal activity, but rather be re-
lated to the performance of higher-level functions and as
such be more ’flexible’–a view suggested by the plastic na-
ture of nervous system, manifesting itself especially in the
reorganization of circuitry underlying certain cognitive or
behavioral functions after brain injury [3,12], with mod-
els attributing the performance of various functions to
flexibly adjustable, distributed algorithmic strategies [5].
In line with this, regardless of which exact areas or cir-
cuits will be involved in execution of a particular func-
tion and processing of relevant information, correspond-
ing synaptic clocks might possibly be activated in those
circuits;
8. Consciousness has been hypothesized to be related
to neural activity that underlies learning, as opposed
to activity underlying events that are yet too ’weak’ or
’unimportant’ to require learning, or, on the other end,
activity underlying performance of already-learned auto-
matic functions that does not need to be updated. Since
the process of learning itself, as well as memories that
were created in some specific life circumstances and are
then recalled by a given conscious experience, are always
associated with some emotional state, or value, accord-
ing to this view consciousness is thus tightly related to
emotions [2]. And since emotions are related to neuro-
modulatory effects in the brain, with neuromodulators,
like dopamine, acting on synaptic traces, possibly with a
delay, and thus modulating learning–synaptic clock can
be thus seen as a mechanism which directly receives, or
’senses’, the information about an outcome that a pre-
ceding or ongoing neural activity has brought for the or-
ganism, as conveyed by the emotional state related with
a given conscious experience (a notion on which we shall
elaborate in the last section).
Based on these points, synaptic clock is thus a concrete
candidate for a content-specific substrate of conscious-
ness, as it (1) defines exactly (i) where, and (ii) in what
(biological) sense, information will be integrated strongly
(satisfying thus some of the requirements as imposed by
IIT), (2) directly relates consciousness to specific neural
mechanisms of learning and memory (which puts it in
line with certain aspects of theories relating conscious-
ness to recurrent signaling and/or processes of learning
and memory), and (3) is capable of accounting for certain
basic phenomenal properties of consciousness, related to
its temporal nature.
To specify, what will constitute a content-specific sub-
strate of consciousness is in this view not a single one
but rather all currently active synaptic clocks, with the
focus of attention affecting which of them, in which cir-
cuits, have greater contribution to the actual contents of
an experience.
If consciousness is indeed present also in animals with
simpler nervous systems, this is a substrate that poten-
tially could be found in very different nervous systems,
since analogous mechanisms of synaptic plasticity, and
synaptic tagging in particular, are found in as phyloge-
netically distant species as rodents and marine mollusks,
respectively [11,13].
3 On the duration of a single mo-
ment of subjective time and the
formation of relational memory
Assuming that synaptic clock, as a mechanism based
on activity-dependent synaptic plasticity, constitutes a
content-specific substrate of consciousness, then what
consequences could be derived from this notion for the
processes of formation of memory of those contents? In
order to make an attempt at this, we will adopt the gen-
eral view in which consciousness evolves from simpler
forms, as mentioned already above.
As is inferred mostly from animal experiments, cellular
and synaptic mechanisms that are responsible for ’alloca-
tion’ and initial encoding of memory of particular events,
determining which cells and synapses will be recruited to
a particular memory trace (defined as a pattern of activ-
ity of specific neuronal ensemble), are also the ones that
lead to linking memories of events that occurred close in
time [14–16]–which suggests that mechanisms of neural
plasticity underlying learning and memory will in them-
selves lead to creation of associations, in a form of rela-
tional memory, between contents of experience that occur
in temporal proximity. However, the question is, how to
measure and express this temporal distance for contents
of conscious experience of different types, and what is its
maximum value to which creation of such associations
is restricted? Since there is a constant flow, on the one
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hand, of conscious experience, as discussed above, with
contents of experience constantly replacing the ones that
preceded them, and, on the other, of neural activity, the
primary question is how to determine the ’meaning’ of a
particular portion of neural activity in terms of contents
of experience to which it would correspond, and then–
how far can different contents of experience be separated
in time for an association to be created between them.
In particular, is there a one-to-one correspondence be-
tween the progression in time of some elements of neural
activity and of contents of experience, respectively? We
propose that a pragmatic approach to these questions is
to assume that an association between different contents
of conscious experience can be formed only if they oc-
cur at the very same moment of subjective time, with
moments of subjective time having different durations,
as expressed in ’neural’ time, depending on the type of
information processed.
It can be noted that, in general terms, the transmission
of effective signals in the nervous system, and correspond-
ingly the interactions of organisms with their environ-
ments, are directional–i.e., neural activity always leads
eventually to some behavioral output (in the sense as
defined above, in section 2–be it even suppression of a
motor action). Assuming that any one conscious experi-
ence is always associated with some neural activity (that
is, in organisms endowed with both nervous system and
consciousness), then the most basic overall situation of a
biological system, being part of some environment, hav-
ing some specific conscious experience, can be described
as: behaving in a certain way when it experiences "this
rather than not this". In this view, the effect of any
experience-dependent synaptic plasticity elicited in such
situation, related with the contents of concurrent experi-
ence, will be to alter the possible patterns of neural ac-
tivity and consequently, due to the directionality, behav-
ioral output. From this perspective, instead of a notion
of static memory traces of particular events, one should
expect memory to behave more like a fluid [17], with neu-
ral plasticity serving primarily the ultimate goal of the
organism, namely of adjusting its behavior to particular
circumstances it finds itself in. In such elementary case,
to create an association between different contents of ex-
perience, in a form of relational memory, primarily due
to plasticity of pre-existing synaptic connections within
an overlapping neural substrate, will be to make the pat-
terns of neural activity and behavioral output related to
those contents convergent, i.e., more similar to each other
than they had been before the association was formed.
As contents of conscious experience we include here all
the content that constitutes a given experience at a given
moment, no matter how ’weakly’ one would be aware of
its presence or contribution to the experience, or whether
one is able to recall and reflect on that experience in a
retrospective manner after some time has passed. That
is, also contents constituted by processes like remember-
ing events, or percepts, perceived in the past, no matter
how distant, or cognitive manipulation of a given percept,
as well as visualizing and thinking about future ones–all
of which, in this view, constitute another experience in
its own right, occurring at some present moment of time,
and being a form of immediate memory, as defined above,
related thus to some neuronal activity, synaptic stimu-
lation and, consequently, formation and persistence of
synaptic traces, i.e., activity of synaptic clocks.
Subjective time flows with variable rate, as we know
it from introspection, and it seems that it flows with yet
different rates for individuals from different species [10].
From the effective perspective of one’s subjective expe-
rience, this can be attributed to an effect resembling
the flicker fusion effect in visual system, with contents
of experience persisting for some non-zero duration of
time before they will disappear, making ’room’ for other
contents. Such a persistence determines thus an irre-
ducible unit of subjectively perceived time, not divisible
into shorter fragments–constituting a single moment of
subjective time, which, however, will be related to some
portion of neural activity extended in time–a window of
’neural’ time of non-zero duration. We posit that du-
rations of such moments of subjective time will be pro-
portional primarily to the time units of synaptic clocks,
in principle different in different brain regions and across
animal species, depending on the type of information pro-
cessed by given synapses (determined, in general, by the
anatomical and functional connectivity of a given region;
approximate distribution of which was proposed in [1]),
and that those moments constitute temporal windows for
the formation of associations between corresponding as-
pects of the contents of experience. Synaptic tagging,
being an early stage of activity-dependent synaptic plas-
ticity, on which the concept of synaptic clock is based,
allows for ’late-associativity’–a prolonged time window
in which, presumably, associations can be created be-
tween events that are separated in time on the neural
level [11]. Although, perhaps, the durations of those mo-
ments will depend also on other plasticity mechanisms
involved in processing of successive events and memory
’allocation’, like the transient cellular-level plasticity (i.e.,
altered neuronal excitability), that affect each other and
act in concert. Especially given that conscious experience
changes at all times continuously, without any clear-cut
borders between successive events, it is thus perhaps a
reasonable assumption to make that, in terms of specific
neural substrate of some contents of experience, although
some neural activities will correlate with the experience
more directly than others, the contribution of different
types of activity might be to a certain degree continuous,
namely, there might be no clear-cut separation between
those on which a conscious experience depends and such
on which it does not. Altogether, the discussed mecha-
nisms will be causing a certain ’inertia’ after an initial
neural event, which will result in the aspects of tempo-
rally overlapping contents of experience to be linked to-
gether. As an instance, for hippocampus and a sensory
area, as depicted in Figure 2–a circuit in which the mo-
ments are longer, e.g., the hippocampus, will integrate
information about the aspects of events that it processes
for any two events that occur within its current moment
of time (thus ’seen’ by it as one event), even if one of
those events occurred in a distant past according to the
sensory area endowed with moments of shorter duration,
i.e., with traces of activity left by that event in the sen-
sory area having decayed long time ago, as judged from
its perspective.
Subjective time understood as representing an order of
events can be reconstructed from patterns of population-
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as well as single cell-level neuronal activity (as shown
in particular in the lateral entorhinal cortex [18]). The
present theory posits that if one extracted a (hypotheti-
cal) component of the evolution of a given activity pat-
tern that could be attributed to plasticity of the neural
substrate, then such components in different brain re-
gions, or subpopulations of cells, would evolve with differ-
ent rates–with synapses with shorter time units returning
to baseline levels more rapidly after an initial stimulation
event.
HIPPOCAMPUS
SENSORY AREA
Event 1 Event 2
single moment of time
Figure 2: Duration of a single moment of subjective time.
Durations of single moments of subjective time, propor-
tional to the time units of synaptic clocks in different
brain regions, in which different types of information are
processed, constituting temporal windows for the forma-
tion of associations between contents of conscious experi-
ence. Two events, certain aspects of which are processed
by both regions, being simultaneous as judged from the
perspective of the hippocampus, are not simultaneous
when judged from the perspective of the sensory area.
Values presented are hypothetical, arbitrary and not nec-
essarily in scale.
The identity of experienced change and
memory
Addressing the above-discussed dichotomy between ex-
perienced change and immediate memory more strictly,
it can be noted that change, by definition, is always rel-
ative to something. In the case of conscious experience,
its change is relative to memory. It is not possible to
conceive of any consciously experienced change without
having also memory of some preceding state, or, the other
way round, to conceive of memory without change. The
latter supposition, although less obvious, comes down to
the same argument–in order for some contents of expe-
rience to become a "memory", and be recalled later, the
experience needs to undergo a change (a process of re-
membering, and comparing a memory with some other
contents of experience, informing us as to what consti-
tutes the present, as opposed to the past as represented
by that memory, in itself implicates a change). Hence,
it can be stated that the constantly experienced change
and, on the other hand, memory, are in fact two different
views on the same phenomenon. Without any of them,
or actually without it, the result would be the same–
namely one would be in a state that could be described
as an ’eternal’, i.e., not-changing, present moment.
This is why the processes of neural plasticity, in partic-
ular such that can be described as being at the same time
a change and a persistence of memory trace of some pre-
vious activity state, seem to be well suited to constitute
content-specific neural substrates of consciousness, and
this is what we shall discuss in more detail next, which
should allow us to look at the above considerations from
yet another perspective.
4 Consciousness as continuous
change
The alternative views on the structure of
consciousness
The notion of the identity of change and memory seems to
be contained in the Bergson’s concept of duration [19,20],
with duration being the persistence of one’s entire mem-
ory, accumulated over the lifetime, in light of which every
new experience is interpreted, what could be labeled as
’implicit imagery’, and being constantly modified over
time by integration with those new experiences. How-
ever, it appears to us that this theory, and a particular
viewpoint that stems from it, cannot be understood prop-
erly or be useful without reconsidering two of its central
aspects, namely (1) its treatment of the concept of mem-
ory ’storage’, and, especially, (2) in what sense the term
’time’ is used by it.
The conventional view on the structure of conscious-
ness assumes that: (1) at any given moment of time it
consists of a collection of separate elements, each of which
constitutes a different entity–„the percept of chair that I
see on the right side of my visual field is something dif-
ferent than the percept of computer screen that I see in
the center of my visual field”, and (2) it consists of a suc-
cession of separate collections of such elements in time,
with elements at each moment of time being different
entities–"the percept of chair that I am having right now
is something different than the percept of that chair that
I had a minute ago", which is depicted on Figure 3A with
such an elements represented by different points. t axis
on Figure 3A denotes time, and x axis can be thought of
as representing a collection of percepts at a given moment
of time, for instance reflecting different points along one
dimension of a visual field. This view, at the fundamen-
tal level, assumes that those elements are different things
and can be represented as such a collection of points, with
each point having different value (representing, for exam-
ple, ’colors’ of ’adjacent’ percepts within a current visual
field). This assumes that consciousness has some dimen-
sion(s) of what could be referred to as ’space’ (x, a set
of all currently experienced percepts) and a dimension of
time (t, a succession of collections of elements, with the
points taking different values, with some of them possibly
becoming equal zero–e.g., no auditory input and hence no
percepts of sounds). This view, however, that such ele-
ments, represented by points, are different ’things’, leads
inevitably to the notion of borders and empty gaps be-
tween neighboring points, that would separate different
points from each other (a problem which remains even if
we assume that the number of points within any interval
along any of the axes is infinite). Whether it will refer to
its physical substrate or to consciousness as such, it is un-
clear how big such a gap is, or how long it lasts, or what
does it consist of, etc. Moreover, since it is by definition
empty, nothing can traverse it, and thus no interaction
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between neighboring points and no dynamics of the con-
scious experience is possible. This would be in fact a
situation, as described already above, of being ’stuck’ in
an ’eternal’, non-changing present moment, without any
consciously experienced change or memory. The alterna-
tive view, which is conceptualized by the notion of du-
ration, and which, as it seems, better describes what we
experience directly in our everyday lives, is that there are
no separate points, being different ’things’, with borders
or empty gaps between them, but instead that conscious-
ness is continuous (along any dimensions)–namely that it
is a continuous change (Figure 3B).
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Figure 3: Change as the dimension of consciousness.
(A–B) Alternative views on the structure of conscious-
ness: static collections of elements (A) vs. continuous
change (B). (C) Relative positions along the dimension
of change, related to different types of information pro-
cessed by two example brain regions. (D) Perception of
an element of experience (fragment in between the black
dashed lines at the ends) vs. perception of the process
of its generation (fragment in between the gray dashed
lines in the middle).
However, if this is indeed the case and a useful theory
is to be built upon this notion, then it seems that, first
of all, the use of term ’time’, and ’space’ as well, is inad-
equate and, moreover, might be somewhat misleading–as
is the case with the duration theory. What appears to us
as a constructive approach is therefore to consider change
itself as the only dimension of consciousness.
The dimension of change
However, once this is recognized, the conclusion is that,
in fact, there are no separate elements experienced at a
given moment of time, nor is there a linear flow of con-
scious experience along an axis of time, as it is commonly
thought of, with separate past, present and future time
moments, but instead that consciousness is always, in a
sense, in the same moment of time and that all experi-
ences are in fact one whole–and this situation is not iden-
tical to the one considered above, namely of an ’eternal’
non-changing moment, nor is it a form of ’presentism’,
according to which time does flow but only present mo-
ments are actually real, as this is, strictly speaking, not
a moment of ’time’, or a ’spatially’ separable fragment
of experience, but a constant change. In other words,
consciousness has no discrete ’spatial’ or ’temporal’ di-
mensions, nor is there a distinguished dimension of ’time’,
along which something would proceed. The difference be-
tween the conventional notion of dimension of time and
that of change is that a single static point located any-
where along the dimension of change represents, in itself,
a change–in the sense as outlined above, namely, a spe-
cific continuous change relative to immediate memory.
Whereas in the case of dimension of time, such a static
point would always represent no change, in any quantity
measured. As behaviors of any system are typically con-
sidered in terms of changes of some quantity with time,
i.e., along the dimension of time, and the goal then is to
account for its dynamics, the reasoning outlined here, in
terms of the possibility of this kind of analysis, may thus
look like a dead end has been reached. And it appears
to us that indeed this might be the case–and that what
can be only studied about consciousness, on the funda-
mental level, is its ’kinematics’, i.e., constructing statis-
tical descriptions of how it behaves, or, in other words,
what observable effects it produces. However, since we
have a direct access to our consciousness from the ’inside’,
meaning that we actually experience it, and are able to
reflect on it, we posit that what might be an especially
promising step forward is the fact of the variability of
rate of subjective time passage that we perceive, which
in combination with indirect knowledge about that rate
in other species [10], might be informative, first of all, as
to what does it mean to move along the axis of change,
as depicted on Figure 3C.
The rationale for speaking about consciousness as hav-
ing a dimension of change, rather than being simply a
discrete point of change, is that since it is continuous, it
seems that it cannot be confined to a static, i.e., discrete,
point of a constant ’rate’, but instead it will at all times
’accelerate’ or ’decelerate’, as is suggested by the vari-
ability of subjectively perceived time passage, which can
be represented as motion along the axis.
The model from Figure 2 could be now modified in a
manner as depicted in Figure 3C, with more change oc-
curring according to the sensory area, as compared to the
hippocampus’ judgment, according to which much less
change has occurred within the same interval of absolute
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time (and we are using here the time-related grammatical
forms–"occurring", "has occurred"–only because of the
lack of a more suitable language). However, the varied
’rate’ of change, that is what is represented as the one-
dimensional axis of change, is not quantitative, as it is by
definition a continuum–it can be considered as such only
in light of a retrospective reflection on a given experience,
as a way of abstract description of the actual experience
(assessing "how many changes occurred"). Instead, from
the subjective perspective of actual experience, change
does not have any particular rate, it just is the way it is,
and its ’rate’ is something we can infer only retrospec-
tively by comparing it with what we then consider to be
some different fragments of experience. The dimension
of change is thus to be treated rather as an abstract tool,
offered by an act of introspection (ability to manipulate
what we consider to be separate pieces of experience),
whereas an actual experience simply changes in some spe-
cific way inherent to it. In other words, quantitative de-
scriptions, using the language of mathematics, based on
the notion of mathematical point, are incompatible with
the essentially qualitative reality of conscious experience.
The act of abstraction and comparing past experiences
appears to rely on memory of those experiences, that
must be somehow stored and preserved over time since
the events originally occurred, which concept we shall
consider next, analyzing whether and how it can be rec-
onciled with the notion of continuous change.
Are memories stored?
The notion of continuous change seems to contradict our
conviction that there are separate elements in every con-
scious experience, constituting different entities, and that
time flows linearly, i.e., from past to future, with past
events, memory of which has been retained, having logic
continuation and consequences in present events. The
concept of memory ’storage’, on which this view is based,
assumes that events that were experienced in the past,
i.e., in some previous moment of time, can be somehow
’saved’, in a static form of memory trace, instead of ceas-
ing to exist, and then retrieved from that store in some
present moment of time–namely that what is considered
a memory recall and an event that is recalled can all be
marked on a line, or an array, like the one on Figure
3A, with past moments of time, when the original mem-
orized event took place, being something different than
the present moment, when it is recalled. However, what
does it mean exactly that memory is ’stored’, and what
evidence there is to support such notion?
Studies on mechanisms underlying memory, with mem-
ory being assessed mostly in behavioral paradigms in an-
imals, suggest that memories are stored in the brain in a
form of neural memory traces, termed "engrams" [21],
being specific patterns of activity of neuronal ensem-
bles requiring plastic synaptic changes to be encoded and
then replayed, that constitute essentially static represen-
tations of some events from the past. However, it can be
noted that every instance of what is thought of as recall
of a memory, always occurs in a context different than
the one in which it was supposedly formed, resulting in
an overall experience being different than (i.e., altered
relative to) the original one (even for the very reason
that this is an event of "memory recall", accompanied by
an awareness of this act of remembering), and it always
takes place in a present moment of time. Moreover, as
discussed here already, the flow of conscious experience
seems to be continuous, without any clear-cut borders
between past and present moments, that would separate
events that were memorized from subsequent remember-
ing of those events. Neural plasticity, to which the forma-
tion of memory is attributed, seems to result primarily
synaptic change
Figure 4: Illustration of the effect of an activity-
dependent synaptic modification on the network activity
patterns. Once the weight of the synaptic connection be-
tween a pair of cells is changed, the replay of an overall
pattern of network activity identical to the one that was
related to an original experience becomes not possible.
Now, as soon as the input cell starts firing, its activity
’attracts’ the activity of the output cell.
not in the formation of rigid, static engrams, but rather in
adaptations to ever-changing situational demands (e.g.,
enabling individuals to plan the execution of appropriate
actions) [17]. Technically, any activity-dependent act of
synaptic plasticity makes it less–not more–likely (or ac-
tually, considering an entire system, impossible) that an
identical overall pattern of network activity will be re-
played in the future (Figure 4). Thus, we do not have
any direct evidence to support the notion that anything
is ’stored’, and can be then recollected, or that there is
any separate ’past’, as commonly thought of assuming
a linear progression of time moments. We have a di-
rect evidence only that our conscious experience changes
constantly. Especially in light of the fact that in the
brain there seems to be no separation of sites of infor-
mation processing from the sites of memory storage (in
contrast to how computers work in this regard). Any
memory-related processes (in any form or at any stage,
be it encoding, consolidation, maintenance, retrieval, re-
consolidation, forgetting, etc) are all constituted by some
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information processing in the brain that takes place, and
affects the functioning of organism, in the present. There
is thus no evident need to assume that what we experi-
ence as "memory" is something that was statically stored
(anywhere, be it brain or mind) at some point in the past.
It looks like the conventional view on time is based on
the notion of static memory, which in turn is based on
the notion of a linear flow of time, both of which are, as
we have attempted to show, not adequate as descriptions
of consciousness on the fundamental level. It appears
to be a case of circular reasoning, which is resolved by
the adoption of the dimension of change–accepting that
no ’storage’ (in the conventional sense of this term) of
memory ever occurs eliminates the problem.
But how to account then for the conviction that there
are past, present and future events in our conscious ex-
perience? In other words, what makes the contents of my
experience appear to me like they represent an event from
the past being remembered in some present situation?–a
question that reduces to a more basic one: what con-
stitutes the ’meaning’ of any one conscious experience
(allowing to distinguish for example a remembering of
an event from the perception of an actual event)?
Seeing or remembering: On the meaning
in the contents of a conscious experience
One could expect that such meaning should be a result
of the intrinsic structure of a given conscious experience,
in which, if it is taken in its entirety, there is contained
information about different elements of the experience
and about relations between them, i.e., how they are ar-
ranged. For instance, that there was a past when a given
event took place, and that it is remembered now in the
present while different percepts are also being perceived
forming a coherent image of the current surroundings,
and so on–the contents of such experience acting thus
like a ’time capsule’, by analogy to fossils, which can be
seen as static ’memories’ indicating that there was some
past in which they were created [22]. The same reasoning
would extend to visualizing the future, which is always
done using some elements from memory, and is done in
the present, constituting an actual experience. Such a
meaning would allow to compare also durations of differ-
ent past intervals, i.e., assessing the number of changes
that occurred, and apply as well to any other experience
constituting hence a coherent whole (with phenomenal
consciousness and cognitive access to its contents being
in this view synonymous concepts, with every instance
of "cognitive access", or a failure of one, constituting ac-
tually another experience [23]). However, in contrast to
fossils as such, whose ’meaning’ needs to be derived by
an external observer, our experiences seem to be self-
interpreted, suggesting that such a static images are not
sufficient.
We argue that what makes this kind of meaning, be-
ing intrinsic in the contents constituting an experience,
possible, is first of all that they are not static, but rather
continuously change–if they were static it would be not
possible for them to actually contain any meaning of this
kind. In the case of a static image we come back essen-
tially to the array from Figure 3A, that is a static col-
lection of points, in which situation it is unclear whether
one’s attention is focused statically on only one particular
point or on all of them at the same time, which anyway
does not lead to the construction of a coherent, mean-
ingful whole, regardless of how structured such an image
would be. And if any meaning cannot be derived in case
of any of such collections individually, it seems to be not
possible also to derive it from a set of collections, each
without any meaning (as such an attempt would be like
looking along yet another dimension of the array). We
posit that what enables the construction of experiences
with this kind of meaning, is a dynamic, immediate pro-
cess of collecting information within ’frames’ of continu-
ous change, which could be described as sampling, and
integration of this information into a meaningful whole–
a process of continuous learning, which we shall consider
below.
In the view outlined, what we consider an explicit re-
call of a memory, has the same function as any percept–it
serves to guide current behavior. It is thus, as a conse-
quence, reasonable to assume that there is no fundamen-
tal difference between structured memories and percepts.
This point of view, and analyzing how these two phe-
nomena are related and what they have in common, in
terms of their ’temporal’ aspect, might be particularly
informative for and will lead us to addressing an issue:
what constitutes the difference between subject and ob-
ject, after we accept that the dimension of consciousness
is change?
Difference between subject and object
It is argued by some that the fact, or actually–feeling, of
the flow of time is not only the most basic aspect that
our consciousness shares with mental lives of individuals
from other species, as discussed above, but is also the
only aspect that it shares, in some way, with the physi-
cal reality, as formulated in a view assuming that time is
real and plays a central role (as opposed to the concept
of a block universe in which nothing changes) [24]–which
perhaps could be understood within some form of the
panpsychism view, according to which something resem-
bling what we know as "consciousness" constitutes the
intrinsic nature of matter [4, 25]. We expect that if this
is indeed the case, then considerations of the physical re-
ality would benefit from adopting a reasoning as the one
outlined above, as purely logical argument, and putting
change as this reality’s only dimension.
Taking this particular perspective, we shall then adopt
a view, according to which the difference between a per-
ceiving subject (i.e., one’s conscious experience) and per-
ceived object (i.e., objective reality) lies not in spatial,
but rather in the temporal domain [20]–however, as we
have resigned from using the term ’time’, or ’temporal’,
arguing why it is inadequate, we posit that this should
be defined rather in terms of change.
Direct perception
The view on the difference between subject and ob-
ject, when defined in ’temporal’ terms, posits essentially
that a subject is wherever the ’pure’ (i.e., autobiograph-
ical/episodic) memory of all of the subject’s past expe-
riences is stored, whereas objects are located always in
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the present, in the currently unfolding moment [20]. We
diverge from this view in assuming that since memory
is always manifested in the present, there is no evidence
or need to assume its ’storage’, or to assume a notion of
past, that would need to be taken into considerations.
Our approach, however, still suggests taking as a start-
ing point the theory of ’direct’ perception [20,26], which
posits that all percepts are images, that essentially are
some selected fragments extracted, in a sense, from an
overall continuous stream of information that the phys-
ical reality is–an ability which evolves, and is developed
in and, to a lesser degree, learned by individuals.
Sampling and integration of information
This theory, in the version by Gibson [26], assumes that
the perception of a specific environment’s structure arises
due to sampling, in which visual information is sampled
over time, in a process dependent on a moving focus of
attention, and integrated in a certain way, in a loop which
involves motor reactions allowing to sample different per-
spectives of the environment, leading to the extraction of
features that are invariant, in order to produce a coher-
ent image guiding possible actions in that environment.
It seems that the maximum rate of such a sampling will
be proportional to the value of CFF in a given species–
whereas visual system as a whole samples continuously,
the resolution of its basic elements will be limited by the
CFF values.
In terms of neural substrate of perception, this theory
suggests that the content of what is being perceived at
a given moment, due to perception being a prolonged
process, will be dependent on an activity not only in
the retina and primary visual areas, but rather it will
involve also activity of certain motor circuits, that alto-
gether constitute a perceptual system, with the engage-
ment of specific neural substrates being modulated by
the attentional processes, i.e., attention focused on dif-
ferent portions or aspects of the environment. Taking
into consideration the fact that even minor parameters
of brain activity can affect the functioning of the brain
as a whole [27, 28], it can be expected that what is ac-
tually being perceived, in details, will be determined by
collective activity patterns that may involve, to varied
degrees, networks of the entire brain.
We posit that other types of information, processed by
different systems, are sampled and integrated in a similar
manner, within temporal windows of duration specific to
them, as represented by the time units of synaptic clocks,
which allows a given system to form a meaningful ’image’.
For example, resorting to Figure 2, with the hippocam-
pus receiving inputs from sensory areas, it will construct
a single image integrating many images constructed at
a higher rate (e.g, ∼60/sec) by the afferent areas, but
also in the opposite direction–if a sensory area receives
input from the hippocampus (possibly an indirect one),
it will construct its consecutive images using information
about a single image being constructed by the hippocam-
pus. Consequently, the ’meaning’ of firing of an output
cell from a given region, in terms of contents of conscious
experience related to that activity, will be determined
by the informational content integrated over the tempo-
ral window of duration specific to that region–through a
process that will include also immediate feedback infor-
mation about the effects that the activity in this tem-
poral window is having on the organism, which we shall
consider below. Contents of a conscious experience as
a whole will arise from the sampling and integration of
information by all subsystems–which perhaps could be
studied using an approach like that of IIT [6].
Two sides of conscious experience
The processes of generation of percepts, including such
being the elements of a memory recall, as well as of any
other contents of experience, have already been either
evolved, i.e., they have been evolutionarily ’mastered’,
or learned, and now they are unconscious and seem to
be immediate, not requiring any effort–namely, a given
content of experience simply appears in consciousness
at some point, e.g., as in the comprehension of speech
where individual words simply appear in consciousness.
We posit that all such contents of experience, including
memories, are, similarly to percepts, fragments that are
’extracted’ from the physical reality as a whole, and sta-
bilized in an apparently unchanged form for some period
of time–constituting thus specific ’paths’ paved in change,
out of all possible paths that could be there at the mo-
ment (change, due to it being continuous, not having any
’temporal’ or ’spatial’ dimensions, can be visualized by
considering that from the perspective of a hypothetical,
relatively small organism perceiving the flow of time in a
relatively "slow motion", within what we consider a space
of a size of a grain of sand an arbitrarily large object could
fit, and within a time window of what we consider a frac-
tion of a second an arbitrary number of different events
could take place–e.g., in a scale relatively close to ours,
that is in the case of insects, like houseflies, which are
thought to perceive the flow of time in a slow motion,
relative to how we perceive it, within an interval that for
us seems to be the blink of an eye they might likely ex-
perience a substantial number of different events–that is
assuming that they are conscious).
Whereas, in contrast to the above, what is conscious is
a process of generation of one’s memory as a whole, that
is, a process of generation of behavioral adaptations–this
is what we experience directly, as continuous learning.
The actual experience, that appears to us as unfolding
in time, is like one were ’inside’ of the process of gen-
eration of some specific contents of experience, e.g., a
percept. ’Zooming’ in that process, one can see it un-
folding, i.e., changing in a specific way, seeing thus its
fine structure (which is like being confined to a specific,
exact point in time), but is then unable to perceive its
global structure and thus will not see that percept as a
whole (by analogy to the uncertainty principle, as known
from time-frequency analysis of time series; as illustrated
on Figure 3D).
In sum, there are two sides from which any one con-
scious experience can be considered, corresponding to im-
mediate memory and change, respectively, as described
above (section 3): when we look at it in a ’retrospec-
tive’, abstract manner, at any stage, we see some specific
contents of experience already formed, persisting in con-
sciousness for some period of ’time’–processing of differ-
ent types of information, related to different contents of
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experience, moves us then along the axis of change (Fig-
ure 3C), proportionally to the corresponding values of
CFF, affecting differently our assessment of the duration
of that experience and thus speed of time flow. However,
looking at it from the other side, when the experience
is actually unfolding, without our reflecting on it, then
each such window, that would be proportional to 1/CFF,
lasts simply as long as it does and its duration cannot be
measured using any arbitrary units, and it constitutes a
process of continuous learning, which we shall consider
below.
What we consider ’space’ and ’time’ in particular, seem
to be abstractions derived from the two opposite extrema
of the change axis, with the notion of ’space’ derived from
a small amount of change (a constant configuration of
objects, not changing over time) and the notion of ’time’
derived from a lot of change (what can be imagined as
if everything in our conscious experience was changing
constantly in a random manner, without any recurring
elements or regularities, then we could not conceive of or
have any conception of space, just of ’pure’ time).
How the brain learns to be conscious
In the sense as outlined above, a neural memory trace,
encoded in a set of synaptic connections, can be seen
as a structure that enables an individual to extract and
’perceive’ a specific information in the physical world.
Therefore, an analogy can be drawn between the process
of generation of memory traces (engrams) and an evolu-
tionary process of generation of structures enabling the
organisms to perceive a specific type of information in
their environment, i.e., to have a specific type of per-
cepts (e.g., of a red light), with inadequate structures,
and traces, being eliminated. One might object that an
episodic memory contemplated in daytime is not some-
thing that can be considered equal to a percept used
pragmatically in some specific situation to navigate in
the environment. However, we posit that, if considered
in light of change, they both equally serve to accomplish
pragmatic goals in respective specific circumstances, e.g.,
when using some elements from memory in order to solve
a mathematical problem–the point is that individuals are
evolutionarily adapted, and learn, to daydream only in
situations in which this type of behavior is desirable, and
not in situations of an immediate danger and need for
an action. This analogy can be defined on the level of
plasticity of single synapses, with emotions acting as se-
lective pressures, eliminating neural memory traces that
are not desirable for the brain.
Conscious experience is always associated with emo-
tional states. Such state can be a fear, or at least a
feeling of discomfort, or a pleasure, or at least a feeling
of comfort, but it is never neutral. As discussed already
above (section 2), emotions modulate learning, in partic-
ular through the activities of neuromodulatory systems,
modulating neural plasticity on the level of synapses, thus
shaping the structure of neural networks. Some circuits
may be affected to a lesser degree, when related behav-
iors are automatic and usually do not need to be ad-
justed (e.g., primary sensory and motor pathways), and
other are more affected, however all seem to be suscep-
tible to such a modulation [29, 30]. It is thus like the
brain was organizing itself, through the neuromodula-
tory effects of emotions, restricting how it changes, by
changing its memory as a whole, and thus selecting what
information exactly it is capable to ’perceive’, i.e., what
contents of experience it can have. Subjective emotional
states, indicating whether organism is in a desirable or a
non-desirable overall state, are present regardless of what
are the contents of a given experience–emotions seems
to permeate every experience. Whereas, in contrast, it
is possible to think (although it does not seem possible
to imagine, or feel) that objective reality changes only
in some neutral, ’random’ way. We posit therefore that
the difference between subject, i.e., our subjective expe-
rience, and object, nature of which might itself resemble
our consciousness, should be sought rather in the domain
of emotions, or actually a sort of micro-emotions [31], in
how they organize the components of a physical system
so that it changes in a desirable way, namely such that
it is able to perceive those pieces of information, e.g.,
as explicit memories or through more implicit imagery,
that give it most adaptive advantage. In this sense it can
be said literally that the brain learns (or, also, teaches
itself) to be conscious [2]–and we posit that the synap-
tic clock represents an elementary process through which
this occurs. Namely, we posit that synaptic clocks deter-
mine ’temporal’ windows in which the following occurs:
(1) information is sampled and integrated, with the type
of information depending on the synapse, which leads
to the extraction of invariant features within the sam-
ple, (2) the sampling and integration in this prolonged
window depends on the activity of the organism, its be-
havior, and feedbacks it receives from the environment,
(3) the result of functioning of all the clocks, as well as of
each clock in particular, is a meaningful ’image’, consti-
tuting some contents of experience (e.g., of remembering
an event), (4) the effect that those contents are having
on the organism is continuously evaluated by dedicated
systems, which leads to (micro-)emotions, reflecting the
brain’s ’opinion’ on its present state, (5) emotions act
through neuromodulation, and PRPs, continuously af-
fecting the synaptic (or, in general, neural) changes, (6)
the modulation of synaptic changes alters the routes of
signals’ flow through the network, and thus content of
information sampled.
5 Discussion
Synaptic clock as an universal mechanism
In support of the existence of a general mechanism of
synaptic clock, based on a generalized notion of synaptic
tagging, in terms of its possible adaptive values, also the
following arguments can be put forward:
1. Modeling studies based on artificial neural networks
show that such networks can develop complex compu-
tational functionalities [32], or learn to guide behavior
in simulated robotic applications [33], when they are
trained using learning rules based on reward-modulated
Hebbian-like plasticity with a single reward signal. In
such paradigms the activity of a network in previous steps
of time makes the synaptic connections involved in that
activity eligible for subsequent reinforcement, with what
can be in general considered synaptic tags. One could
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expect that developing a distribution of synaptic traces
whose durations of persistence are varied and adjusted
specifically to enable the action of such signals on par-
ticular synapses, being first of all not too short but also
not too long, would be even more effective for specific
learning purposes and thus beneficial for organisms;
2. Synaptic learning and memory is estimated to
be relatively cheap energetically, in terms of metabolic
costs of sustaining a synaptic memory trace [34]. One
could therefore expect that the durations of persistence
of such synaptic memory traces, in particular of their
initial stage corresponding to synaptic tagging, can be
shaped evolutionarily in a flexible manner–where longer-
lasting, behaviorally not immediately beneficial traces
can be ’tested out’, not being under a strong require-
ment of limiting the energy expenditure;
3. Activity-dependent synaptic plasticity and LTP
in particular might serve different functions in different
brain systems, that is, encode different types of mem-
ory and thus give different results in terms of specific
circuits’ functioning and cognitive processing [35]. Cor-
respondingly, through one general mechanism of "synap-
tic clock" various effects on the networks’ activities and
associated cognition could be realized. In light of the
fact of time being a universal ecological dimension, the
existence of varied distributions of instances of "synap-
tic clock", that are shaped by how organisms interact
with their environments, especially by rate of those in-
teractions, being adjusted to their specific needs, would
suffice different organisms and different brain systems–in
this sense making it a parsimonious explanation;
4. At the moment of a synaptic event corresponding
to an experience that should be memorized, the avail-
ability of various PRPs, potentially needed to actually
implement the synaptic change, might be varied, and
they can be at different stages of their production pro-
cess [36, 37]. It is conceivable that in different synapses,
with synaptic traces of different durations, there might
be a varied dependence of plasticity on the PRPs at dif-
ferent stages of the production process. Namely, activity-
dependent synaptic plasticity in synapses with gradually
longer time units of synaptic traces could be less de-
pendent on: only already-synthesized proteins immedi-
ately available at the synaptic site (produced due to some
preceding events)→mRNAs whose translation has been
paused at the elongation stage and can be reactivated on
demand→mRNAs before translation initiation→de novo
transcription. Varied time units of synaptic traces would
thus lead to varied dependence of activity-dependent
synaptic plasticity on the history of a given synapse’ and
cell’s activity. Although it is rather unclear whether this
would in itself constitute a desirable feature.
Synaptic clock as a neural substrate of
consciousness vs. possibly no conscious-
ness in certain states or systems
How to reconcile the proposed mechanism of synaptic
clock, or some related mechanism based on neural plastic-
ity, as a substrate of consciousness, with cases of certain
systems or situations in which, possibly, there is no con-
sciousness associated with them? For instance, in case of
(1) dreamless sleep, (2) cerebellum, which, as it seems,
does not give rise to any conscious experiences, or (3)
lower animals, e.g., marine mollusks (like Aplysia Cal-
ifornica), which may or may not be conscious–despite
substantial amounts of neural activity and plastic synap-
tic changes in all of them [7,13,35]?
Our main argument is that we aimed to find an ac-
count for certain properties of consciousness, and what
is proposed is that whenever consciousness is present the
persistence of its contents will correlate with some synap-
tic traces (possibly with only a subset of them, and per-
haps in some systems only, that is such with synapses or
some analogous processes)–but not that synaptic plastic-
ity is in itself sufficient for any conscious experience to
occur. Also, other mechanisms both upstream as well as
downstream of the plasticity might be involved to certain
degrees, as considered already above, including also con-
tribution from glial cells. As memory trace of an event
progresses, conscious experience of that event may be
related first to synaptic tags, e.g., a protein phosphory-
lation, and then more to RNAs being transcribed in an
activity-dependent manner, or to cellular-level plasticity,
or neuronal firing, and so on.
However, also some additional lines of reasoning could
be proposed for two of the above cases. Namely, for
(1) cerebellum–this structure can be considered a part
of low-level sensory/motor circuits, and thus (as it was
postulated for such regions in [1]) it may possibly have
so short-persistence, almost zero-duration synaptic traces
that, together with the possibility that consciousness as-
sociated with its activity may have no ’vivid’, easily-
recognizable form–such on which attention cannot be fo-
cused, its impact on a conscious experience will be in
result not ’noticeable’; also, the brain activity patterns
likely need to be taken as a whole, if the exact contents of
an experience are to be considered–we do not know how
it would be like to be a cerebellum, if separated from the
rest of the brain–it might affect the conscious experience
as a whole in some way [7]; (2) sleep–from the perspec-
tive of one’s conscious experience the dreamless sleep can
be viewed as a period in which the perceived time flow
speeds up so that this period seems to last infinitely short
(when assessed in retrospection)–thus it is like the mo-
ment just after awakening was a continuation of the one
just before falling asleep or, alternatively, the one just be-
fore the last dream experienced during the night ended
(and because of that, one cannot be sure when exactly
the dream occurred, that is, whether it was just before
the awakening or, maybe, just after falling asleep)–hence
the supposed lack of consciousness during the dreamless
sleep could support the view that when no low-level sen-
sory data is being processed in an integrated manner, and
no movements executed, the remaining type of informa-
tion processing speeds up the time flow so substantially.
6 Conclusion
To sum up, in the present study we proposed (1) that
synaptic clock might constitute a content-specific neural
substrate of consciousness, (2) a viewpoint in which the
formation of associations between contents of conscious
experience, in a form of relational memory, can take place
only if they occur at the very same moment of subjective
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time, with moments of subjective time having different
durations, proportional to the time units of correspond-
ing, active synaptic clocks, and (3) a line of reasoning
showing why consciousness as such can be best under-
stood if change is considered its only dimension.
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